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Risk, Trade, Recovery, and the Consideration of 
Real Options: The Imperative Coordination of 
Policy, Marketing, and Finance in the Wake of 
Catastrophe 
Mark R. Manfredo and Clifford J. Shultz II 
Recovery from societal and market catastrophe is a daunting process that requires multifunctional, 
systemic, and long-term efforts. Humanitarian id and donor assistance are rarely sufficient. Trade and 
other forms of direct investment in devastated markets offer another kind of recovery assistance. 
However, isks encountered in recovering economies can deter firms from investing. The authors apply 
a real-options framework toexamine the financial feasibility of trading with recovering economies; they 
apply the framework to the countries of the war-disintegrated former Yugoslavia. The real-options 
framework considers the value of managerial f exibility in the presence of risks. The authors discuss 
implications for policy, marketing management, export development, and economic and societal 
recovery in several contexts. 
Tsunamis, hurricanes, earthquakes, mud slides, terrorist 
attacks, and war can be massively and incomprehensi- 
bly catastrophic events. They can obliterate entire com- 
munities and societies, including marketing systems and 
processes requisite to sustain those societies. "Lucky" sur- 
vivors often struggle to subsist in the bleakest, most unsafe, 
unsanitary, and dangerous conditions-often from minute to 
minute. 
The best initial efforts to restore some semblance of sta- 
bility typically rest in humanitarian aid and other forms of 
donor assistance from unaffected and/or wealthy countries 
and institutions, such as the Red Cross, Red Crescent, and 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. How- 
ever, aid and assistance are inadequate for large-scale mar- 
ket reconstruction, full societal recovery, and long-term 
welfare. Resource-strapped agencies are unable to meet all 
the needs over time, donor fatigue saps energy from well- 
intended projects, and the inevitable next catastrophe draws 
resources and attention from previously devastated regions. 
Sometimes pledges never materialize, as evidenced with the 
reconstruction efforts with respect to the World Trade Cen- 
ter, Hurricane Katrina, and many places devastated by the 
tsunami that swept across the Indian Ocean (e.g., Dewan, 
Connelly and Lehren 2006; The New York Times 2005). 
Therefore, other mechanisms for market and society recon- 
struction must be implemented. 
Full or optimal recovery requires long-term commitments 
and coordinated orchestration by numerous institutions, 
including governments, nongovernmental organizations, 
firms/marketers, and consumers. Good governance is imper- 
ative to the process. Well-governed markets, countries, 
regions, and communities tend to suffer less damage ini- 
tially and to recover more quickly from catastrophe 
(Allenby and Fink 2005; Shultz 2005). Policies that favor 
investment and broad forms of engagement in devastated 
areas are needed. This idea has not been lost on others. In 
referring to recovery efforts in the wake of the recent 
tsunami, The Economist (2005, pp. 51-52) notes that "aid 
agencies have bombarded fisherman with offers of new 
boats, but no one has paid to rebuild the factories that used 
to supply the ice to preserve their catch." 
In short, too often, there is no coordinated effort to 
(re)build a sustainable, functional marketing system; aid 
agencies favor projects such as schools, but they often 
neglect important infrastructure projects, such as roads, 
ports, and sewage. In general, conditions deter private- 
sector investment, which is vital for enterprise creation, 
jobs, and socioeconomic development. Potential investors 
interested in important infrastructure projects and other 
forms of engagement usually view the devastated areas that 
would benefit the most as being too risky. This is especially 
true in war-ravaged and politically volatile areas, where cat- 
astrophe can exacerbate tensions, often making them even 
less inviting. Because further conflict is possible and still 
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more destruction and suffering are likely, a truly vicious 
cycle of devastation and deprivation results. The cycle 
becomes particularly difficult to break when governments 
fear and resist engagement with investors from countries 
with different cultural and political values, despite obvious 
societal benefits that can result from investment. Therefore, 
recovery from catastrophe requires a skillful melding of pol- 
icy, market understanding and risk assessment, financial 
services and markets, and marketing practices to rebuild 
sustainable marketing systems as evinced by prosperous and 
peaceful societies. 
In this article, we address the integration of these issues 
toward efficacious market and societal recovery in the after- 
math of catastrophe. We do this with an eye toward several 
themes espoused in the call for papers for this special 
section-namely, the role of marketing in reconstruction 
from catastrophic devastation, including the roles of eco- 
nomic and trade policy and the social, moral, and legal obli- 
gations to assist recovering economies (Mittelstaedt 2007). 
We contend, perhaps counterintuitively, that there are some 
inherent advantages to risk and instability if there is flexi- 
bility to respond to this uncertainty. Risk and instability can 
expedite domestic or foreign direct investment (FDI) to the 
benefit of marketing firms and to the marketing systems, 
countries, and citizens in the destroyed area, country, or region. 
Risk and (War) Recovery 
Countries or areas that are recovering from catastrophic mil- 
itary hostilities and are also rebuilding economies are risky 
markets. There is considerably more risk endemic to the 
process of marketing to, with, and in these markets and to 
managing value chains (from source to consumer) than in 
markets that are not recovering from war (Kwok and Reeb 
2000). Notably, risk has been revisited as a scholarly focal 
point for marketing and public policy, though it has largely 
been studied from a consumer's perspective (e.g., Johnson 
2004). We expand the perspective by taking a cross- 
disciplinary tack; that is, we consider financial and broad 
market risks with implications for marketing, managerial 
decision making, and, ultimately, policy and recovery. 
We examine war and other forms of calculated military 
and paramilitary armed conflict because of the systemic 
depth and breadth of devastation and the human element 
that causes and sustains them and, accordingly, because they 
likely are the most difficult catastrophes from which to 
recover. Moreover, and as we hinted at previously, other 
catastrophes can slip into armed conflict and other forms of 
violence, resulting in more death and destruction. This pos- 
sibility was and is true of Banda Aceh, Sri Lanka (both dev- 
astated by the 2004 tsunami), and even New Orleans (more 
recently damaged by Hurricane Katrina). Thus, strategies, 
tactics, and solutions for war recovery likely can be lever- 
aged to provide relief and recovery efforts from other 
catastrophes. 
More specifically, we examine the amalgam of factors 
that affect risk and recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croa- 
tia, and Slovenia, countries that emanated from the disinte- 
grated Yugoslavia and are still experiencing the economic 
and social impacts of wars that occurred in the 1990s (e.g., 
Shultz et al. 2005). Various sources of risk are likely to cre- 
ate considerable variability in the returns from marketing 
investment in and export to these recovering economies 
(Kwok and Reeb 2000; Miller 1992),1 which in turn will 
affect the pace and scope of recovery. Despite compelling 
reasons to enter such markets (e.g., pent-up consumer 
demand, market size, the inevitable need for food), many 
exporters of value-added food products, for example, have 
chosen to avoid the countries that emerged from the former 
Yugoslav republics (FYR) because traditional measures 
suggest that levels of risk are unacceptable.2 Although com- 
mercial country risk measures are often helpful in providing 
broad insights into political and economic conditions, they 
have been found to have little power in predicting periods of 
intense instability or unique opportunity (e.g., Oetzel, Bet- 
tis, and Zenner 2000). 
Although any export or business venture in a recovering 
economy is risky, there may actually be value in this uncer- 
tainty, especially if marketing managers have and maintain 
flexibility to respond to it. Consistent with this idea, Miller 
(1992) suggests several strategies that companies can 
employ when they are faced with uncertainty (risks) in inter- 
national markets. If the value of this strategic flexibility can 
be quantified at the time an investment decision is made 
(e.g., during the consideration of an export venture), it may 
indicate that the venture is more valuable than originally 
believed. Real-options analysis, also known as contingent 
claims analysis, is a framework that can be used to value 
managerial flexibility in the presence of uncertainty (e.g., 
Copeland and Keenan 1998; Dixit and Pindyck 1994), and 
it has been suggested for valuing marketing strategy (Dias 
and Ryals 2002; Ward and Ryals 2001). Failure to consider 
the existence and value of real options embedded in any 
risky investment likely underestimates the true value of the 
investment (Mun 2002). 
If U.S. food enterprises intend to invest in more markets 
replete with more risks, they need a way to evaluate more 
appropriately marketing relationships in the presence of 
uncertainty, which may be unruly at times (Thomas 2001). 
This is particularly true when considering an export venture 
to FYR and other recovering economies. Although all 
export ventures are exposed to uncertainty, the lingering 
perception of instability and war in these countries may be 
the greatest hindrance for trade to and in the region. Given 
some shortcomings in previously mentioned measures and 
techniques, a real-options approach to evaluating prospec- 
tive export ventures to FYR is compelling. If managers con- 
sidered the option value of their strategic decisions to enter 
recovering economies, such as FYR, they may be more 
inclined to engage these countries, despite considerable 
uncertainty. In turn, engagement could increase trade to the 
region and likely render the region less uncertain; that is, 
risk would be reduced. Considering the real-options value of 
1These are just a few risks to which exporters and other international 
marketers may be exposed. For a further delineation and classification of 
risks faced by firms conducting business in international/foreign markets, 
see Miller (1992), Kwok and Reeb (2000), Flynn and colleagues (1994), 
and Reeb, Kwok, and Baek (1998). 
2We base this conclusion on a series of in-depth interviews (McCracken 
1988) we conducted over a 12-year period with members of the food value 
chain, government authorities, trade associations, and nongovernmental 
organizations throughout the region, in the United States, and in the Euro- 
pean Union (EU). However, we add that exports and other forms of trade 
and investment should not be limited to food. 
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an export venture to the region may also stimulate policies 
that help promote trade with the region and, more generally, 
trade with recovering economies, thus expediting recovery. 
In light of the preceding text, an objective of this research 
is to evaluate the real-options value of potential investment 
in and export ventures to recovering economies. In doing 
this, we also develop a systematic way of considering and 
measuring risks associated with an export venture to coun- 
tries in which scant data are available for quantifying the 
unique risks of such a project. Furthermore, valuing options 
that may be present in risky export ventures provides con- 
siderable insight into the design of marketing strategies and 
policies that could be used to enhance trade with these coun- 
tries, in particular those that capitalize on maintaining mana- 
gerial flexibility in the presence of risk. Specifically, we 
examine the case of an enterprise that is evaluating the fea- 
sibility of entering the recovering countries of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia. We examine these 
three countries given the likely differences in both real and 
perceived risks of conducting business throughout the FYR. 
Although the implications from our real-options analysis 
can apply to any recovering economy, the countries of FYR 
are particularly compelling and challenging because they 
are (1) of sufficient size and sophistication to be of interest 
to most marketers and (2) still recovering from various lev- 
els of war devastation (e.g., Glenny 2000; Pecotich, Renko, 
and Shultz 1994; Shultz et al. 2005; Silber and Little 1997). 
In some regions, that devastation manifests in profound dis- 
ruption of infrastructure, production, and distribution capa- 
bilities and can further exacerbate ethnic tensions, all of 
which impede efficient markets and effective marketing 
(e.g., World Factbook 2005a, b; cf. World Factbook 2005c; 
see also World Bank 2006a, b, c). Yet in other regions-- 
namely, Slovenia and the developed coastal regions of Croa- 
tia-the risks are likely not greater than traditional Euro- 
pean Union (EU) trading partners. Furthermore, this 
research presents a framework that managers can adapt 
when considering export ventures not only to FYR but also 
to other recovering countries. In this spirit, we hope that 
managers and policy makers will appreciate the options 
value of these potential investments and that our analysis 
will lead to additional trade in recovering economies and, 
ultimately, to win-win incentives to sustain peace and pros- 
perity through mutually beneficial commerce. 
We organize the remainder of this article as follows: First, 
we examine the recent literature on applications of real 
options and apply a methodology for crafting a real-options 
problem that gives the exporting firm the flexibility to aban- 
don, expand, or contract the marketing efforts in response to 
uncertainty. Second, we outline an efficient framework to 
model the variability of cash flows to an export venture-a 
key input in real-options analysis-specifically focusing on 
the unique and varied risks of conducting business in Slove- 
nia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Third, using general 
assumptions, we estimate and present the real-options value 
of conducting business in each of these countries, and then 
we consider how the real-options value may change by 
varying the assumptions of the real-options model. Examin- 
ing how the real-options value changes under various sce- 
narios for the inputs of the model provides considerable 
insights into and recommendations for the design of mar- 
keting strategies and policies that may be effective in 
enhancing trade with recovering and emerging economies, 
such as those in the FYR. In the final section, we summarize 
our findings and implications, particularly in terms of how 
the value of these real options adds considerable informa- 
tion to the decision and policy-making process in the con- 
text of risky export ventures. 
Real-Options Analysis 
Discounted cash flow analysis is the standard tool for eval- 
uating the financial feasibility of real investments (Brigham 
and Houston 2004). If the discounted future cash flows from 
a project are greater than the initial investment, the net pre- 
sent value (NPV) is positive, which suggests that economic 
gains to the firm would be realized if the project or invest- 
ment were adopted. Although the risk of the project is typi- 
cally accounted for by means of a risk-adjusted discount 
rate, traditional discounted cash flow techniques do not 
inherently consider the value of strategic options (i.e., mana- 
gerial flexibility) in the presence of risk (Mun 2002). 
In general, an option provides the right but not the obli- 
gation to take some form of action at a specified time or over 
a specified period. For example, a call option on an individ- 
ual stock gives the holder of the option the right but not the 
obligation to buy the stock at a particular price-called the 
exercise or strike price-over a set period (Hull 2000). This 
option inherently has value because the holder has the right 
but not the obligation to invest in the stock at the strike price 
(Black and Scholes 1973; Merton 1973).3 Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994) suggest that in the presence of managerial flexibility, 
investments in real assets contain option values analogous to 
that of financial assets. Specifically, an investment contains 
real-options value if it contains an irreversible financial 
commitment (i.e., sunk costs), uncertainty in returns over 
time, and a unique opportunity to invest (Dixit 1989; Dixit 
and Pindyck 1994; Richards and Patterson 2004). 
A general result from options pricing theory is an under- 
standing of the factors that drive an options value. Two of 
the most important drivers are the time to maturity and the 
variability of the underlying asset (Black and Scholes 1973; 
Hull 2000; Merton 1973). For example, the longer the time 
to invoke the option, the greater is the option value; the 
more volatile the underlying asset, the more valuable is the 
option. Indeed, as we show in the next section, it is the 
volatility of the underlying asset that becomes the prominent 
factor in real-options analysis. Combining the real-options 
value of the investment with the result from a traditional sta- 
tic NPV analysis provides a more accurate estimate of the 
true value of the investment, especially the inherent value of 
managerial flexibility in the presence of uncertainty. 
Applications are numerous, varied, and relevant to mar- 
keting and public policy. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show 
how to value undeveloped resource reserves, environmental 
policy design, and entry and exit strategies (see also Amram 
3The Nobel Prize-winning research of Black and Scholes (1973) defines 
the value of call option on a dividend-paying stock to be a function of the 
price of the underlying asset (stock price), the strike price, the time to matu- 
rity of the option, the risk-free rate of return, and the volatility of the under- 
lying stock price (see also Merton 1973). Although this research has helped 
foster the multibillion dollar financial derivatives industry, it has also 
allowed both scholars and practitioners to apply similar option pricing 
methods in valuing real options-namely, the option value inherent in real 
investment decisions (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). 
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and Kulatilaka 1999; Copeland and Antikarov 2001; Mun 
2002). Other applications include investment timing, market 
expansion and product development (e.g., Copeland and 
Keenan 1998), customer relationships (Ward and Ryals 
2001), and evaluation of brand extensions (Dias and Ryals 
2002). Specifically, Dias and Ryals (2002, p. 116) note that 
"for brand managers, flexibility such as the ability to 
increase or decrease brand extension investment depending 
on future circumstances might be very valuable indeed to 
enable them to respond to changes in market circum- 
stances." This line of thinking is consistent with that of a 
marketer who is considering a new venture into a recovering 
economy. Richards and Patterson (2002) further demon- 
strate that the uncertainty related to marketing commodity 
exports can have significant value. 
Real-options analysis provides an ideal framework for 
considering risky investment decisions, such as the decision 
of whether to trade with a recovering economy. Instead of 
viewing uncertainty as a negative, real-options analysis 
views the ability to deal with uncertainty as a positive. The 
value of managerial flexibility, such as the option to expand 
or contract marketing efforts after the investment is initi- 
ated, must be considered in addition to the NPV of the 
investment at the time of the investment decision. Only 
through the valuation of real options can the full potential 
value of an investment decision be considered. In the fol- 
lowing section, we develop the specific case of a food com- 
pany that is considering investment in a trading venture with 
the recovering economies of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. 
Methodology 
Similar to other marketers (e.g., Franses 2005; Wittink 
2005), we believe that there is some utility in modeling to 
assist marketing and policy decision making. The develop- 
ment and articulation of our model and subsequent applica- 
tions follow. 
Crafting and Valuing Real Options 
In considering the financial feasibility of entering into an 
export venture with a recovering economy, managers are 
likely to rely on discounted cash flow analysis-namely, 
NPV analysis. The NPV is calculated as follows: 
(1) NPV = -INVEST+ CF1 + CF2 ...CFn, 
(1+i)1 (1+i)2 (1+i)n 
where -INVEST is the initial investment in the project, CFt 
is the incremental cash flow at time t (t = 1, ..., n), and i is 
the risk-adjusted discount rate.4 The appropriate risk- 
adjusted discount rate for a firm depends on many factors, 
including the firm's cost of capital, debt structure, market 
risk, and the perceived risks of the project under examina- 
tion.5 That is, adjusting discount rates for risk reduces the 
present value of future cash flows, thus providing a more 
conservative NPV assessment. Although NPV is the stan- 
dard metric for assessing any financial investment decision 
and the standard point of departure for real-options analysis, 
a most-probable-outcome NPV resulting from decision tree 
analysis or scenario analysis is also appropriate. Under con- 
ventional capital-budgeting decision criteria, the decision to 
enter the export market would be accepted if the NPV were 
positive. That is, the present value of the projected cash 
flows over the life of the export project is greater than the 
initial investment, in theory providing the firm with an 
instantaneous increase in wealth through the adoption of the 
venture. Even in situations in which NPV is projected to be 
positive, management may still be reluctant to engage in an 
export venture with a country that is recovering from war 
because of the substantial unknowns of entering these mar- 
kets. However, considering the real-options value of the 
project when assessing initial financial feasibility-namely, 
the value of managerial flexibility in the presence of uncer- 
tainty-should provide additional information to manage- 
ment about the true value of this potential investment. Not 
only does considering the real-options value of the invest- 
ment in conjunction with the standard NPV provide man- 
agement with a true understanding of the real value of the 
investment considering its inherent volatility, but the real- 
options value may also be enough incentive to persuade 
management to engage in the project. Thus, the true value of 
the export venture, considering its real-options value, is 
(2) NPV + Real-options value. 
In illustrating the differences in real-options value, we 
consider Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. For 
example, the Slovenian economy is robust, and in 2004, it 
joined the EU. This is mainly because Slovenia escaped 
much of the carnage during the wars of the 1990s. At the 
other extreme, Bosnia-Herzegovina is still reeling from the 
effects of war and economic devastation. Although conceiv- 
ably numerous options can be valued in the context of a firm 
considering an export venture in these countries, the specific 
real-options problem we examine and apply here is that of 
the option to choose among various courses of action after 
the venture is initiated; this is often referred to as a "chooser 
option" (Copeland and Antikarov 2001; Mun 2002). Thus, 
management has the option (choice) to expand the export 
venture, scale back marketing efforts, or abandon the export 
venture anytime during the project's life.6 Although it is 
well known from option pricing theory that the longer the 
option is available, the greater is the option value, we define 
the anticipated length of the export venture (and the option 
to choose) as six years. Although management would 
undoubtedly view a successful long-term export relationship 
to return positive cash flows considerably beyond six years, 
this time frame is reasonable to consider initial financial fea- 
sibility of the project and the chooser option under exami- 
nation.7 Another important consideration for the real- 
4The use of risk-adjusted discount rates for international projects is con- 
sistent with the findings of Reeb, Kwok, and Baek (1998), who suggest that 
despite reductions in systematic risk from diversification, risk-adjusted dis- 
count rates are justified for international projects. 
5For a discussion and methods for estimating risk-adjusted discount rates 
in capital budgeting, see Brigham and Houston (2004). 
6The consideration of these actions (abandonment, expansion, contrac- 
tion, or staying the course) is not related to a particular project design or 
marketing plan, nor do we assign specific probabilities to these actions. 
These are merely responses to uncertainty or risk that are likely to exist in 
an export venture to a recovering economy. Provided that management 
indeed is ensured the flexibility to respond to this risk, ex ante real-options 
value should exist in the presence of a potentially risky investment. 
7In a case study examining the financial feasibility of introducing a 
value-added food product to an export market, Henley and Sanders (1994) 
estimate the cash flows to the venture over a six-year period. 
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options value, especially when an export venture to a coun- 
try recovering from devastation is under consideration, is 
that flexibility in managing the venture is ensured. This is 
possible by considering specific marketing strategies with 
built-in flexibility in a particular project design, as well as 
the promotion of public policies that promote flexibility and 
risk taking (e.g., export credit guarantees). If managers do 
not have the flexibility to respond to risk, real-options value 
essentially disappears. 
Given the complex nature of a chooser option, we use a 
binomial option pricing model with risk-neutral probabili- 
ties (Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein 1979). For complex options, 
such as that which we outline here, binomial methods are 
more flexible. They are more intuitive and easier to convey 
to management and other decision makers than closed-form 
solutions and differential equation methods (Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994; Mun 2002; Richards and Patterson 2004).8 
When binomial methods are used in valuing real options, 
two binomial attices are needed---one that shows the evo- 
lution of the underlying asset and one to derive the option 
value. The following information is also needed to value a 
real option: the option's strike price (X), the present value of 
the underlying asset (So), the time to maturity of the option 
(t), the risk-free rate of interest (r), and the volatility or 
annualized standard eviation of the underlying asset (a). 
Figure 1 shows the binomial lattice for the underlying 
asset, So; we develop this following Hull's (2000) specifica- 
tion. Here, the underlying asset So reflects the present value 
of the future cash flows to the export venture. This binomial 
lattice evolves over six years, commensurate with the initial 
life of the investment and the options defined. The u and d 
represent the up and down steps in the binomial lattice; we 
defined this as 
(3) u = ea, d = e- 
=- 
where, again, a is the volatility of the future cash flows to 
the export project, e is the exponential function, and At is the 
number of incremental time steps designated per year. If we 
assume only one time step per year, then At = 1.9 Note that 
the down factor, d, is also the inverse of the up factor (1/u). 
Thus, the underlying lattice in Figure 1 illustrates how So 
can potentially evolve over time, depending on the predicted 
volatility of the project represented by a. 
Figure 2 shows the equity lattice for the chooser option, 
which is needed in conjunction with the underlying lattice in 
Figure 1 to find the real-options value. Following Mun's 
(2002) procedures, we use the end nodes of the equity lattice 
to reflect the maximum value of abandonment, expansion, 
contraction, or staying the course for the chooser option. In 
general, each end node of the equity lattice can be expressed 
as follows: 
(4) Max[Il, I2, 034],4 
where D1I to (44 reflect the net value to each of the options 
considered. For (1, the net value of the option is simply the 
salvage value that would be obtained from abandonment. 
That is, we assume that that the firm can recover at least a 
portion of its yearly variable production and marketing 
costs. The value of the expansion option, 02, is 
(5) (D2 = ai - C, 8Hull (2000) and Mun (2002) show that binomial methods hould pro- 
vide similar eal options to closed-form solutions (e.g., Black and Scholes's 
[1973] pricing methods). In the limit, binomial and closed-form methods 
should be equal (Hull 2000). 9The term t is an adjustment to annualize the standard eviation, a. 
Figure 1. Binomial Lattice of Underlying Variable: Present Value of Cash Flows (So) 
Sou6 
Sou5 
Sou4 1-SouSd 
Sou3% Sou4d 
Sou2 Sou3d Sou4d2 
Sou Sou2d Sou3d2 
So Soud Sou2d2 SSou3d3 
Sod S~Soud2 Souu2d3 
Sod2 Soud3 Sou2d4 
Sod3 Soud4 
SSod4 SoudS5 
Sod5s 
Sod6 
u = eo JA (up factor) 
d = e-(A = 
-1 (down factor) 
e = exponential function 
So = present value of future cash flows 
a = standard eviation of discounted cash flows 
-At = time factor 
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Figure 2. Equity Lattice of the Option to Choose: Abandonment, Expansion, Contraction, or Status Quo 
End Nodes 
Intermediate Nodes 
(Backward Induction) 
Each end node = Max[()1, 2, 1 (3, (94], where (1) is the value of the abandonment option, 
(D2 is the value of the expansion option, (43 is the value of the contraction option, and 
()4 reflects taying with the original course of action. 
Each intermediate node = Max[()1, (D2, 13, (14, Q], where (1) to ()4 are defined as before, 
and Q = e-rAt[pVu + (1 - p)Vd], where e is the exponential function, r is the risk-free 
rate of interest, p is the up probability, 1 - p is the down probability, Vu is the value 
of the previous up node, and Vd is the value of the previous down node. 
where a is the amount that sales are expected to expand 
(e.g., a = 2 indicates a doubling of sales), ri is the value 
taken from the corresponding end node in the underlying 
lattice (Figure 1), and c is the cost of expansion. Similarly, 
the option to scale back marketing efforts, 03, can be 
expressed as follows: 
(6) ()3 = fr1i + S, 
where P is the amount that sales are expected to contract 
from the scaling back efforts (e.g., P = .5 indicates a reduc- 
tion of sales by 50%) and s is the cost savings from reduc- 
ing marketing efforts. Finally, the option to stay the course, 
04, is merely the value in the corresponding node of the 
underlying lattice (ri). 
After we calculate the end nodes of the equity lattice, we 
use backward induction to find the intermediate nodes of the 
equity lattice. The intermediate nodes are all nodes to the 
left of the end nodes in the equity lattice (Figure 2). In doing 
this, it is necessary to calculate risk-neutralized probabili- 
ties. Using both the up and down factors examined in Equa- 
tion 3, we determine that the probability of an up movement 
on the binomial lattice is equal to 
ert -d (7) p - 
, 
where e is the exponential function, r is the risk-free interest 
rate, At is the number of time steps (At = 1), and u and d are 
the up and down factors, respectively, as shown in Equation 
3. Thus, the probability of a down movement on the bino- 
mial lattice is merely 1 - p. When we use these risk- 
neutralized probabilities and backward induction, each of 
the intermediate nodes can be expressed as follows: 
(8) Max[1l, 02, )3, 0)4, E], 
where 
01, 02, 03, 
and D04 are defined as before and Q is 
(9) = erAt [PVu + (1 - )Vd], 
where, again, e is the exponential function, r is the risk-free 
rate of interest, p is the risk-neutralized up probability, 1 - p 
is the risk-neutralized down probability, Vu is the value of 
the previous up node, and Vd is the value of the previous 
down node. Moving from right to left on the lattice ulti- 
mately leads back to the first node in the equity lattice. Fol- 
lowing this backward induction procedure, the value of the 
first node of the equity lattice reflects the present value of 
future cash flows to the project, given the combined options 
to abandon, expand, scale back, or stay the course. There- 
fore, the real-options value is merely the difference between 
the value in the first node in the equity lattice in Figure 2, 
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Vo, and the static present value of the future cash flow 
stream, So (Vo - So = Real-options value).10 
Indeed, it is a that ultimately drives the real-options 
result. From options pricing theory, a positive relationship is 
known to exist between volatility (a) and the value of an 
option. Although, at first glance, this suggests that highly 
risky projects imply greater real-options value, this is not the 
case. Ex ante real-options value exists only if there is flexi- 
bility in the project design itself such that management can 
respond to uncertainty. If this flexibility does not exist, the 
option value is essentially zero. Furthermore, ex post real- 
options value (after the project is engaged) may decline or 
even go to zero if the risks considered ex ante do not mate- 
rialize or if the flexibility to respond to risk is somehow con- 
strained. This is similar to how financial options may lose 
value over time if the level or the volatility of the underlying 
financial asset changes. Meaningful estimates or forecasts 
of a, usually based on historical data, are also needed to 
assess real-options value adequately. However, deriving 
estimates of a associated with the cash flows of a new 
export venture to a recovering country is difficult, given that 
there is likely no history of similar transactions and an over- 
all paucity of publicly available, high-quality data to derive 
such an estimate. Despite this, the incorporation of Monte 
Carlo simulation methods, coupled with existing knowledge 
of risk assessment and classification presented in the inter- 
national business literature, can be used to capture robustly 
the likely risks associated with an export venture into FYR 
in an estimate of a. 
The preceding binomial option pricing model is an effi- 
cient method of estimating the real-options value of an 
export venture (specifically, the chooser option defined) at 
the time of the investment decision. Therefore, the binomial 
option pricing model should not be confused with the tradi- 
tional decision tree analysis often used in project valuation. 
Although binomial option pricing and decision tree analysis 
appear similar, they are indeed different. Decision tree 
analysis is important for graphically depicting strategic ini- 
tiatives and strategies over time. That is, decision tree analy- 
sis illustrates the strategic pathways that a firm can take 
throughout the course of the project. Decision trees are also 
useful in comparing alternative designs of a project. Identi- 
fying and understanding the decision points in the project, 
the nature of the decisions to be made, and the costs/benefits 
and probabilities associated with each outcome and each 
node of a decision tree lattice provide critical information to 
the decision maker. Depending on the specific project 
design, there may be strategic options that need to be valued 
at each node in a comprehensive decision tree that thor- 
oughly analyzes all strategic decisions. This may be the 
most important complementary aspect of the two methods. 
In this case, binomial option pricing methods (which we 
presented previously) can be used to value certain real 
options that may be available at different decision nodes in 
a comprehensive project design.1l However, it is important 
to remember the differences between relating options pric- 
ing, as we described previously, to actual project design and 
implementation. 
Monte Carlo Simulation for Estimating Risk 
In the context of international trade, numerous factors are 
likely to create variability in the project's cash flow stream. 
Researchers have suggested many alternative ways to clas- 
sify these risks (Flynn et al. 1994; Miller 1992; Reeb, Kwok, 
and Baek 1998). For example, Miller (1992) takes a general 
management view of risks and develops three major cate- 
gories of interrelated uncertainties: general environmental 
uncertainties, industry uncertainties, and firm uncertain- 
ties.12 General environmental uncertainties focus on the fac- 
tors that affect all industries, including political uncertain- 
ties (e.g., war, political turmoil), government policy 
uncertainties (e.g., price controls, trade restrictions), macro- 
economic uncertainties (e.g., inflation, foreign exchange 
risks, changes in relative prices), social uncertainties (e.g., 
social unrest), and natural uncertainties (e.g., natural disas- 
ters). Under industry uncertainties, Miller develops subclas- 
sifications reflecting risk factors that are specific to the 
industry that the firm operates-namely, uncertainties aris- 
ing from the input market or the product market or competi- 
tive uncertainties. Specific examples of these risks include 
changes in market supply, miscalculations of market 
demand and product acceptance, and competition. The clas- 
sification of firm uncertainties are related to the risk factors 
that are firm specific, including delays in payment, culture- 
based misunderstandings, unreliable third parties, trans- 
portation bottlenecks, problems with customs brokers, and 
other issues that may disrupt product flow and payment. 
Flynn and colleagues (1994) note that many people view 
Miller's (1992) general environmental uncertainties as the 
most important drivers of volatility, encompassing many, if 
not most, of the aforementioned risks. Indeed, it is likely 
that most managers immediately consider these risks when 
evaluating decisions to introduce a new product to a recov- 
ering region. Although numerous commercial rating ser- 
vices provide political risk assessments and related informa- 
tion designed for exporters, which attempt to gauge these 
risks (e.g., Dun & Bradstreet), according to Oetzel, Bettis, 
and Zenner (2000), these country risk measures, though 
informative in general, provide little value in predicting 
periods of major instability in a country. Although it is clear 
that numerous risks drive the variability of cash flows, these 
risks are difficult to quantify and predict with any precision. 
For example, what is the probability that war will break out 
again in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that product will be lost in 
transit, or that infrastructure bottlenecks will delay delivery 
of the product and jeopardize a key business relationship 
with an importer? 
10Binomial option pricing methods incorporate recombining lattices 
(Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein 1979; Hull 2000). Therefore, it is important not 
to confuse the binomial option pricing method shown here, which is explic- 
itly used to value the real option, with traditional decision tree analysis, 
which may or may not incorporate recombining lattices. 
11Mun (2002, pp. 242-45) details the differences in real-options valua- 
tion versus that of decision tree analysis, as well as how the two forms of 
analysis can be used together to conduct complex project decision and deci- 
sion analysis. 
12Flynn and colleagues (1994) and Reeb, Kwok, and Baek (1998) pro- 
vide alternative classifications of risk, but they are similar in concept to 
Miller's (1992) taxonomy of risks. 
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Copeland and Antikarov (2001) note that Monte Carlo 
simulation provides a robust method of incorporating multi- 
ple risks to arrive at a single measure of the volatility of 
future discounted cash flows, a, to use in the valuation of 
real options; they suggest that only three or four key risk dri- 
vers need to be explicitly modeled to keep the simulation 
robust and tractable. Following this suggestion, we develop 
a Monte Carlo simulation model to derive an ex ante esti- 
mate of the variability of cash flows of an export venture to 
the countries of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. We assume that each of the following factors 
drives the variability of future cash flows to the venture: 
price, quantity sold, major disruptions, and foreign 
exchange rates. Focusing on these factors keeps the simula- 
tion tractable and also adequately and robustly captures the 
influence of the myriad risk factors that previous researchers 
have identified. 
In estimating the future cash flows of an export venture, 
a firm usually has some estimate of the price that it will 
charge for the product, the quantity of the product it antici- 
pates selling, and the costs associated with producing and 
marketing the product. These factors are unique and depend 
on the specific product marketed and the unique cost struc- 
ture of the firm, and knowledge of these factors is critical in 
estimating the expected cash flows to an export venture. 
However, the Monte Carlo simulation model we develop 
here is general enough to estimate the variability of cash 
flows (a) for any export venture into a developing or emerg- 
ing economy.13 
We make the following baseline assumptions in the 
Monte Carlo simulation, and then we apply the risk factors 
examined in the next section to this base case, depending on 
the country examined. First, we assume that both price and 
quantity are one, such that revenue (price x quantity) is also 
one.14 Second, we assume that variable costs to the export 
venture are a fixed 80% of total sales. Because fixed costs 
do not vary with the quantity of sales, we do not explicitly 
model fixed costs. Therefore, we assume that the cash flows 
to the project for each year are revenue less costs.15 Third, 
we assume that the initial life of the export venture under 
consideration is six years. We conduct the Monte Carlo 
simulation using 10,000 iterations; therefore, we incorporate 
almost every conceivable scenario, providing a robust simu- 
lation of the discounted cash flows. Thus, with each draw in 
the simulation, we estimate new values for the cash flows 
for Periods 1-6 (CFI-CF6) of the project, and we discount 
these cash flows using a risk-adjusted discount rate of 
15%.16 From this simulated discounted cash flow stream, 
we estimate a as the standard deviation of r defined as 
follows: 
(10) r= lnIn PVI + CF1PV PVo 
where PV1 is the current value of future cash flows in Period 
1, CF1 is the cash flow (not discounted) at Year 1, and PVo 
is the current value of discounted cash flows at Year 0. As 
Mun (2002) suggests, only PV1 and CF1 are stochastic in 
Equation 10, whereas PVo is the static present value of the 
future cash flow stream. That is, at the completion of the 
10,000 iterations of the Monte Carlo simulation, a distribu- 
tion of r is produced, and we use the standard deviation of 
this distribution, a, in the binomial option pricing model. 
Given this baseline model, we incorporate the following 
major risk factors in considering export ventures to Slove- 
nia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina: price, quantity sold, 
major disruptions, and foreign exchange risks. In the fol- 
lowing sections, we describe how these factors are modeled. 
Price 
We designate price as a stochastic input variable in the 
Monte Carlo simulation. For each country modeled, we 
assume that the initial export selling price of $1.00 grows at 
4% per year, consistent with average inflation witnessed 
during the past decade. The initial $1.00 price assumes sta- 
ble exchange rates; thus, it reflects the relative price of the 
good in both the exporting and the importing country. How- 
ever, a distribution around the trend inflation rate of 4% is 
established to account for uncertainty in this price point over 
time. We assume that the distribution around the price trend 
is lognormal; the mean of the distribution is set at the previ- 
ous period's price, and the standard deviation of the distrib- 
ution is the standard deviation of historical exchange rate 
returns of the specific importing country (foreign currency/ 
U.S. dollar) for the period of 1995-2003 (13% for Slovenia, 
12% for Croatia, and 8.8% for Bosnia-Herzegovina).17 We 
assume that the distribution around the trend is lognormal 
because (1) the lognormal distribution is commonly used to 
describe financial asset returns, such as foreign exchange 
rate returns that we used to create the distribution around the 
trend, and (2) the lognormal distribution has a slightly 
longer and narrower right tail than the normal distribution. 
This is consistent with most price behavior. That is, prices 
tend to be sticky downward but not upward. 
The preceding method preserves the constant trend in 
price (4%) but also places a range around the price trend to 
account for variability in the price over time. Although it is 
13For a detailed explanation of Monte Carlo simulation methods for use 
in real-options analysis, see Mun (2002) and Copeland and Antikarov 
(2001). The @RISK program is an Excel add-in program commonly used 
by financial analysts to incorporate risk in financial modeling, and it is used 
to program the Monte Carlo simulation model used in this research. 
14Because a is an estimate of the standard deviation of returns, r, defined 
in Equation 10, and returns are percentages, only the variability of price and 
quantity is important in its calculation. Therefore, the levels of prices and 
quantity sold are immaterial from a mathematical perspective in the esti- 
mation of r and a. The assumption that both price and quantity equal 1 
allows for simplicity in modeling. 
15Accounting revenue arguably does not equal cash flow. Noncash 
expenses, such as depreciation, are routinely added back to net income in 
determining the relevant cash flows to an investment project. However, this 
model focuses on the variability of cash flows from the exporting venture. 
Cash flows that are unique relative to a firm's accounting practices, such as 
depreciation, are firm specific and are not likely to be influenced by risks 
inherent in exporting to an emerging market. 
16To focus on the primary factors that drive the variability of the cash 
flows from the export venture only, we assume that the risk-adjusted dis- 
count rate is fixed at 15%. We use this risk-adjusted discount rate for illus- 
trative purposes. A firm's unique risk-adjusted discount rate is a function 
of its cost of capital, capital structure, market risk, and project risks. 
17Before the introduction of the euro, the Bosnian mark was pegged to 
the German mark and is now effectively pegged to the euro. Therefore, the 
8.8% standard deviation noted for Bosina-Herzegovina reflects the annual- 
ized standard deviation of euro/$ exchange rate returns from the launch of 
the euro in 2002-2003. 
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reasonable that price increases linearly through time with 
inflation, it is also reasonable to assume that prices charged 
by the exporter may need to be raised or lowered in response 
to various factors-namely, exchange rate volatility. 
Indeed, exchange rate fluctuations may actually lower or 
raise the price of the exported good in the importing coun- 
try. If exchange rate movements are such that the price of 
the good in the importing country increases, it may be nec- 
essary for the exporter to lower its invoice price to the 
importer to keep prices in the importing country stable. It is 
also likely that over time, the exporter will need to adjust 
prices to account for changes in the supply and demand of 
the product in the importing country that may or may not be 
due to changes in the exchange rate. Therefore, the proce- 
dure reasonably accounts for the uncertainty in prices over 
time that may be caused by several factors. 
Quantity Sold 
We also designate quantity sold as stochastic in the Monte 
Carlo simulation. It is likely to fluctuate greatly over time 
for several reasons, including acceptance of the product in 
the importing market, increased or decreased demand for 
the product over time, competitive response, the strength 
and success of business relationships along the supply chain, 
and so forth. Moreover, large currency devaluations in the 
importing country may cause local demand for the product 
to fall greatly, thus reducing the quantity of the product sold 
in a given year. Conversely, an appreciation of the local cur- 
rency relative to the dollar may induce greater demand for 
the imported product. 
We begin with the quantity sold as one, and we allow 
quantity sold through time to take on three different annual 
growth trends with equal probability of occurrence in the 
Monte Carlo simulation: rapid growth, moderate growth, or 
declining growth. We assume these growth trends for each 
of the countries under examination. For rapid growth, we 
designate the growth rate as a uniform distribution i  which 
the rate can range from 15% to 45%. The moderate and 
declining growth rates are also designated as uniform distri- 
butions. For moderate growth, the values range from 2% to 
10% and, for declining growth, from -10% to -1%. Thus, at 
any given iteration of the simulation, rapid, moderate, or 
declining annual growth rates commensurate with the uni- 
form distributions e tablished have an equal chance of being 
drawn. The uniform distribution is appropriate for consider- 
ing a range of values that have an equal probability of occur- 
rence. Although there may be cases in which management 
has information or prior experiences that suggest that the 
distribution of potential growth rates is not uniform, a range 
of growth rates with equal probability of occurrence picks 
up the considerable uncertainty surrounding the quantity of 
goods that are likely to be sold into a market that is recov- 
ering from devastation. Furthermore, we place a distribution 
around the growth trend to account for variability in the 
trend over time. We assume that this distribution is normal; 
the mean is the previous year's quantity sold, and the stan- 
dard deviation is 2% for Year 1 and increases 1% annually 
for Years 2-6. Thus, the uncertainty around the trend quan- 
tity sold increases as the time horizon increases. Because 
there is no guidance or experience available in determining 
the appropriate distribution to use in establishing a cone of 
uncertainty around a trend variable, such as quantity sold, 
the normal distribution is a safe assumption and is robust for 
establishing variation around a trend variable. Although the 
assumptions about he distribution around the trend are sub- 
jective, they adequately consider variability in quantity sold 
over time. In essence, it is nearly impossible to predict the 
quantity of product sold over time with any degree of accu- 
racy over the long run, so the simulation assumptions we 
present here account for the variability that may arise in the 
cash flows over time due to the quantity of product sold into 
the respective country. We also consider costs, which fluc- 
tuate with the quantity of product sold (e.g., variable costs), 
and fix them at 80% of total sales revenue; however, costs 
are likely to be considerably higher if there is a major dis- 
ruption in the export venture. 
Major Disruptions 
When considering the launch of a new product into a recov- 
ering economy, management is likely to consider the worst 
scenario, namely, major disruptions to the ongoing export 
venture that could eventually bring harm to the venture 
itself, as well as to the entire firm and its stakeholders. In a 
Monte Carlo simulation framework, these major disruptions 
are likely to be events that are not captured by the normal 
stochastic modeling of price and quantity we described in 
the previous two sections. For example, delays in payment, 
or even default in payment by an import customer, would 
likely strain the marketing relationship to the point that the 
relationship would be severed. Similarly, key import cus- 
tomers may become dissatisfied with aspects of the exporter 
and decide to sever the relationship. Loss of product due to 
poor infrastructure, corruption, lack of proper product han- 
dling, and theft is also a concern. For a perishable food prod- 
uct, lapses in proper product handing could create a food 
safety scare that may damage brand reputation to the extent 
that consumer demand for the product is effectively reduced 
to zero. Furthermore, local and national governmental con- 
trols may make it difficult o complete an international busi- 
ness transaction successfully or may disrupt an ongoing 
relationship with an importer. Other major disruptions may 
be caused by instabilities in the local and national govern- 
ment, the banking system of the destination country, politi- 
cal strife, and, in the worst case, a resurgence of war. 
Given that political risks tend to be much more systematic 
in nature, Oetzel, Bettis, and Zenner (2000) suggest that 
political risks are often encompassed in currency exchange 
rate fluctuations. However, many of the risks outlined are 
nonsystematic in nature and likely are not captured by 
exchange rate fluctuations. Indeed, major disruptions are 
likely to represent unique shocks to the cash flow stream 
that could create considerable variability of discounted cash 
flows; these may best be modeled by a jump diffusion 
process (Richards and Patterson 2004). However, modeling 
a jump diffusion process requires a considerable amount of 
historical data (e.g., firm-level export transaction data to the 
FYR) to pick up and model the shocks that the firm may 
have realized in the past. For a firm in the initial stages of 
considering an export relationship to the FYR, or perhaps to 
any recovering region, data of this nature do not exist. 
Therefore, we explicitly model major disruptions in the 
Monte Carlo simulation. 
The Dun & Bradstreet Exporters' Encyclopedia (see Dun 
& Bradstreet 2001) publishes information useful for 
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exporters, including information on credit and payment con- 
ditions, such as local delays and foreign exchange delays. 
Local delays represent the average time beyond the desig- 
nated payment terms that an importer in the destination 
country delays the deposit of payment in its local bank. For- 
eign exchange delays reflect the average time between the 
deposit of funds in a local (foreign) bank and receipt of 
funds by the exporter. Both measures provide at least some 
information about the nonsystematic risks we discussed pre- 
viously-namely, risks that affect payment. For Croatia, 
local delays ranged from one to three months, and foreign 
exchange delays also ranged from one to three months. Fur- 
thermore, Dun & Bradstreet suggested that new import cus- 
tomers should obtain letters of credit, but more flexible 
terms could be used for established customers. For Slovenia, 
local delays were reported between zero and two months, 
and foreign exchange delays were reported between zero 
and one month. Local and foreign exchange delays were not 
reported for Bosnia-Herzegovina, but local delays and for- 
eign exchange delays for Ukraine were reported between 
four and five months, and letters of credit were recom- 
mended for all customers, both new and established. 
Although Ukraine is not part of the FYR and has not 
recently suffered the atrocities of civil war, it represents a 
transitioning economy because it is recovering from marked 
political upheaval; furthermore, it is rated as a very-high- 
risk country by Dun & Bradstreet (2002). Thus, the infor- 
mation for Ukraine is likely to be similar to that of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, though the absence of such data from Bosnia- 
Herzegovina hints at even greater risk. On the basis of local 
delays, foreign exchange delays, and the fact that Slovenia 
is now part of the EU and has suffered little damage during 
the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, Slovenia is likely to have 
the smallest probability of a major disruption; conversely, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is likely to have the largest. 
In the Monte Carlo simulation, we assume that if a major 
disruption occurs, a considerable reduction in top-line reve- 
nue will be realized. Although many exporters are likely to 
use some form of product payment insurance, a major dis- 
ruption could cause serious problems, such as the severing 
of a customer relationship, which would cause a major loss 
in income for that year. However, this reduction in top-line 
revenue is likely to differ from country to country. For 
example, if a major disruption were to occur in Slovenia, the 
impact to revenue would be much less severe and temporary 
than in, for example, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, we 
model reduction in revenue using a uniform distribution, 
ranging between -1% and -10% for Slovenia, -2% and 
-20% for Croatia, and -5% and -50% for Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. The uniform distribution is appropriate when 
modeling ranges in which values within the ranges are 
assumed to have an equal probability of occurrence. In the 
case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, if a major dis- 
ruption were to occur, reduction in revenue would be 
between -5% and -50%, and any value within this range has 
an equal chance of being drawn in the simulation. In model- 
ing major disruptions themselves, we use subjective proba- 
bilities that incorporate the Dun & Bradstreet local delay 
and foreign exchange delay measures as guides. For Slove- 
nia, we assume that there is a 95% chance of no major dis- 
ruption and a 5% chance of a major disruption. For Croatia, 
we assume that there is a 70% chance of no major disruption 
and a 30% chance of a major disruption. Finally, for Bosnia, 
we assume that there is a 60% chance of a major disruption 
and a 40% chance of no major disruption. 
Although top-line revenues are likely to suffer during 
times of a major disruption, increased costs to the export 
venture are also likely to be realized. Indeed, the firm will 
likely incur considerable costs in attempting to collect pay- 
ment, reestablish customers, negotiate contracts and contin- 
gencies, travel, and so forth. Thus, when a major disruption 
is realized in the Monte Carlo simulation, variable costs 
increase as well. Similar to the impact on top-line revenue, 
the costs associated with remedying a major disruption are 
likely to be considerably less for a more developed country, 
such as Slovenia, than for a less developed country, such as 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. As described previously, we assume 
that variable costs are 80% of revenue and that they increase 
by 1%-10% for Slovenia, 2%-25% for Croatia, and 5%- 
30% for Bosnia-Herzegovina in the case of a major disrup- 
tion; the ranges for the cost increase are represented by a 
uniform distribution. Again, with Bosnia-Herzegovina as 
the example, if a major disruption were to occur, costs 
would increase anywhere between 5% and 30%, and there 
would be the equal probability of occurrence under the uni- 
form distribution. 
Foreign Exchange Risk 
Oetzel, Bettis, and Zenner (2000) use shocks in foreign 
exchange rates (foreign currency/U.S. dollar) as a proxy for 
political risk. If exchange rates are floating and foreign 
exchange markets are efficient, the exchange rate between 
two countries should reflect factors that drive the supply and 
demand for the foreign currency, including macroeconomic 
and political factors. It is difficult to model explicitly the 
changes in value that arise because of general exchange rate 
fluctuations in a given period (e.g., year). Each individual 
export transaction is exposed to exchange rate volatility, and 
this volatility can be managed with various risk manage- 
ment approaches (e.g., Butler 2004; Henley and Sanders 
1994; Jacque 1981). 
Although we capture routine exchange rate fluctuations in 
the modeling of price in the Monte Carlo simulation, a big- 
ger concern is how large devaluations in foreign currency 
relative to the U.S. dollar affect the demand for imports in 
the destination country. Large devaluations in currency, 
defined as devaluations greater than 20% (Oetzel, Bettis, 
and Zenner 2000), are rare events (shocks) and should be 
modeled as such. The standard deviation around price trend 
that we described previously is consistent with the standard 
deviation of relative historical exchange rate changes for the 
countries examined, but it does not consider explicit shocks 
to the exchange rate regimes (e.g., Oanda Corporation 
2003). Moreover, Bosnia-Herzegovina has a fixed 
exchange rate mechanism that is tied directly to the euro. 
Thus, the risk with a fixed exchange rate mechanism is that 
the foreign government (e.g., the Bosnian government) 
devalues the currency relative to the pegged currency, dis- 
rupting the Bosnian mark/U.S. dollar exchange rate and 
potentially making U.S. imports more expensive to Bosnia- 
Herzegovina consumers. Indeed, major devaluations of 
recent years (e.g., the devaluation of the Argentine peso) has 
greatly increased the price of U.S. goods and services in 
Argentina; we revisit this comparison subsequently. 
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We specify the potential for exchange rate shocks in the 
Monte Carlo simulation. From 1995 to 2003, year-to-year 
exchange rate returns did not exceed 20% for Slovenia; 
therefore, we do not model exchange rate shocks for this 
country. However, from 1999 to 2000, the Croatian kuna 
lost approximately 21% of its value, constituting one major 
devaluation from 1995 to 2003. Given that the Bosnian cur- 
rency is pegged to the euro, we use historical exchange rate 
data for the Argentine peso (1995-2003) to define the 
probability of a major devaluation in a fixed exchange rate 
regime. Over this time span, there was one major devalua- 
tion in the Argentine peso relative to the U.S. dollar, which 
occurred in January 2002, from which time the Argentine 
peso was allowed to float freely relative to the dollar. Fol- 
lowing this, we designate that there is a one-eighth chance 
of devaluation occurring (i.e., from 1995 to 2003, one major 
devaluation occurred) in both the Croatian kuna and the 
Bosnian mark relative to the U.S. dollar. If a major devalu- 
ation occurs at any iteration of the Monte Carlo simulation, 
we assume that revenues are reduced by 20%-50% follow- 
ing a uniform distribution, a likely result due to the likely 
decreased demand for U.S. imports. Again, the uniform dis- 
tribution is appropriate in this case because a range of val- 
ues is established, and we assume that all percentages 
between these ranges have an equal probability of occur- 
rence if a major devaluation is realized. Although a large 
devaluation in the U.S. dollar relative to these foreign cur- 
rencies may influence consumers in the importing country 
to purchase U.S. exports-a likely scenario as the dollar 
continues to weaken in world currency markets-the more 
relevant downside risk to an exporter is that of the foreign 
currency declining in value relative to the U.S. dollar. 
Results 
Table 1 presents the estimated a for Slovenia (.369, or 
36.9%), Croatia (.419, or 41.9%), and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(.716, or 71.6%). Not surprisingly, Bosnia-Herzegovina has 
the highest standard deviation of annual discounted cash 
flows. Indeed, although any export venture is risky, most 
exporters would view a 72% annual standard deviation in 
discounted cash flows as an indication of unruly risk at best. 
However, the consideration of the real-options value in light 
of this risk provides considerable insight into the inherent 
value of this volatility, especially in the presence of mana- 
gerial flexibility. 
To make the results general and ultimately to draw policy 
and marketing implications from the real-options values 
estimated, we assume the following for the chooser option: 
The present value of future cash flows, So, is $100,000. 
Therefore, from a static NPV perspective, if So is greater 
than the initial investment for the export venture, NPV is 
positive, and management should engage in the project. For 
Table 1. Estimates of a from a Monte Carlo Simulation 
for Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
aT 
Slovenia .369 
Croatia .419 
Bosnia-Herzegovina .716 
the option to abandon, we assume that the salvage value is 
$50,000. If management deems a pullout to be necessary 
over the six-year initial life of the venture, the firm will be 
able to recover or save $50,000 from its actions. In consid- 
ering the option to expand, we assume that the expansion 
factor, (a, in Equation 5 is 2 and that expansion costs, c, are 
$50,000, such that expansion efforts will realize a twofold 
increase in sales but cost the firm an additional $50,000. 
Similarly, in considering the option to reduce or contract 
marketing efforts, P in Equation 6 is .5, so that a reduction 
in marketing efforts will realize a decrease in sales by 50% 
but will come at a cost savings, s, of $25,000. Each individ- 
ual exporting firm will have its own costs and unique 
assumptions for the chooser option, depending on the spe- 
cific design for the project as determined before engaging in 
the venture, but the general assumptions we present here, 
with the estimates of a presented in Table 1 for Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, provide baseline real- 
options values that can be further examined. 
Table 2 presents the real-options values for export ven- 
tures to Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina based 
on the foregoing assumptions. The real-options value is 
$70,090 for Slovenia, $74,010 for Croatia, and $96,707 for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. For illustrative purposes, Figure 3 
shows both the underlying and the equity lattice for the case 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina; the real-options value of $96,707 is 
the difference between the initial node on the equity lattice 
and the initial node on the underlying lattice, respectively. 
Consistent with option pricing theory (e.g., Black and 
Scholes 1973; Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein 1979; Hull 2000), 
the larger the a, the larger is the real-options value, when 
all other factors are held constant. These results confirm 
this theory and, if we hold all other assumptions constant, 
show that the export venture with the highest estimate of a 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina) has the highest real-options value, 
whereas Slovenia, the least risky venture, has the lowest. 
Moreover, the results are compelling from an export mar- 
keting and development perspective; indeed, they suggest 
that there is considerable value in the presence of risk, espe- 
cially if management has the ability to adapt to this risk 
through flexible marketing strategies. Indeed, flexible pro- 
ject designs provide greater real-options value than projects 
Table 2. Estimated Real-Options Values for Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Real- 
Options 
Value 
Slovenia $ 70,090 
Croatia $ 74,010 
Bosnia-Herzegovina $ 96,707 
Baseline Assumptions 
Present value of future cash flows $100,000 
Cost savings from option to abandon $ 50,000 
Increased costs from option to expand 
marketing efforts $ 50,000 
Expansion factor (a) 2.00 
Cost savings from option to scale back 
marketing efforts $ 25,000 
Contraction factor (3) .50 
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Figure 3. Underlying Lattice and Equity Lattice Using Baseline Assumptions: Bosnia-Herzegovina 
$7,344,041 
$3,588,772 
$1,753,706 $1,753,706 
$856,974 $856,974 
$418,773 $418,773 $418,773 
$204,639 $204,639 $204,639 
$100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 
$48,866 $48,866 $48,866 
$23,879 $23,879 $23,879 
$11,669 $11,669 
Underlying Lattice $5,702 $5,702 
$2,786 
$1,362 
$14,638,082 
$7,129,983 
$3,462,170 $3,457,412 
$1,670,912 $1,666,386 
$803,732 $792,304 $787,545 
$390,249 $377,966 $361,717 
$196,707 $187,801 $174,049 $150,000 
$103,073 $95,361 $81,917 
$63,444 $58,527 $50,000 
$50,491 $50,000 
Equity Lattice $50,000 $50,000 
$50,000 
$50,000 
with fewer built-in options. This value is not considered by 
traditional static NPV analysis. Intuitively, riskier projects 
have larger real-options values because management has the 
flexibility to respond to this risk. Therefore, it is important 
to remember a true definition of risk-that is, the variability 
of outcomes. Accordingly, risk can be valuable because 
upside risks result in positive outcomes to the firm and its 
customers, and management may indeed be able to weather 
downside risks through proper risk management and the 
flexibility to respond. 
For Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, if an exporter 
determined that the NPV of an export venture to Bosnia- 
Herzegovina was $100,000, the true value of the project, 
considering the combined options to abandon, expand, con- 
tract, or stay the course, would make the project more valu- 
able than previously considered ($96,707 more under these 
baseline assumptions). Similarly, if the project were deemed 
to have a negative NPV-for example, a negative NPV of 
$50,000--the true value of the project would be a positive 
$46,707 if the real-options value were considered, making 
the project financially feasible. Regardless of the assump- 
tions made, these results show that there is a clear economic 
advantage to taking risks, and the risks of an export transac- 
tion with a recovering economy should be valued accord- 
ingly to make a more accurate assessment of the costs and 
benefits of such a venture. Exporters that are risk takers and 
are exceptionally skillful at adapting to changing market 
conditions and, at times, to unruly risks are likely to find 
these ex ante real-options values compelling. Similarly, 
exporters that are highly educated on the business and mar- 
keting practices of the region are likely to maneuver better 
through the myriad risks associated with exporting to a 
country such as Bosnia-Herzegovina (and, implicitly, other 
recovering economies) and thus will likely find the ex ante 
real-options value of the project as an extra incentive to 
begin an export venture into the country. However, the exis- 
tence of this ex ante real-options value is conditioned on the 
premise that flexibility in responding to risk indeed exists 
and is ensured. 
Although the relationship between volatility and real- 
options value is clear, important marketing and policy impli- 
cations can also be drawn through a careful examination of 
the other assumptions that define the chooser option. Table 
3 presents the baseline real-option value for Bosnia- 
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Table 3. Changes in Real-Options Value (Chooser Option) for an Export Venture to Bosnia-Herzegovina Resulting from 
Changes in Baseline Real-Options Assumptions 
Changes in Real-Options Assumptions and the 
Real-Options Assumptions Real-Options Value from the Baseline 
Cost savings from option to abandon $ 0 $ 25,000 $ 50,000 $ 75.000 $100,000 
Real-options value $ 87,994 $ 87,944 $ 96,707 $109,342 $122,237 
Increased costs from option to expand marketing efforts $ 0 $ 25000 $ 50,000 $ 75,000 $100,000 
Real-options value $110,620 $103,664 $ 96,707 $ 89,869 $ 83,140 
Expansion factor (a) .00 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 
Real-options value $17,772 $ 17,772 $ 50,456 $ 96,707 $143,304 $189,900 
Cost savings from option to scale back marketing efforts $ 0 $ 25000 $ 50,000 $ 75.000 $100,000 
Real-options value $ 96,707 $ 96,707 $100,456 $113,655 $128,481 
Contraction factor (j) .00 .25 .50 .75 1.00 
Real-options value $ 96,707 $ 96,707 $ 96,707 $ 96,707 $ 96,707 
Notes: Numbers that are in bold and underlined represent the baseline real-options assumptions. The number in bold ($96,707) represents the baseline real- 
options value, incorporating the baseline assumptions. All other underlined numbers represent deviations from the baseline assumptions, with subse- 
quent changes in the real-options value below the respective number. For example, changing the cost savings from the option to abandon to $25,000 
from $50,000 (baseline) lowers the real-options value of the chooser option to $87,944, if all other assumptions are held constant at their baseline 
values. 
Herzegovina ($96,707) and then considers how the real- 
options value would change given changes in real-options 
assumptions, all else being equal. In the abandonment 
option, there is a positive relationship between the money 
saved from abandoning the export venture and the real- 
options value. For example, if the savings from abandon- 
ment were $100,000, the real-options value would be 
$122,237. If there were no value to the firm to abandon the 
export venture after it engages in it, the real-options value 
would still be substantial at $87,994 considering the chooser 
option, even though the abandonment option on its own 
would be worthless. This result suggests that the combined 
options to expand and/or contract marketing efforts are 
more valuable in the presence of risk than the option to 
abandon the export venture. Under the presented scenario 
assumptions, at least $28,000 in cost savings must be real- 
ized before the abandonment option contributes to the value 
of the chooser option. 
Indeed, the option to expand in the face of risk is most 
valuable from a real-options perspective. Varying the 
expansion factor from two times sales to three times sales 
raises the real-options value to $189,900, almost doubling it. 
At the other extreme, if no additional sales are realized when 
additional marketing efforts and marketing costs are under- 
taken, the real-options value declines dramatically to 
$17,772. If market share expands by 50% because of these 
increased efforts, the real-options value increases consider- 
ably to $50,456. Similarly, in the context of the option to 
expand marketing efforts, the lower the costs of this market 
expansion, the higher is the real-options value, if we hold all 
other assumptions constant at the baseline levels. If sales are 
assumed to double but no additional marketing costs are 
realized, the real-options value rises to $110,620 from the 
baseline of $96,707, for which $50,000 in additional mar- 
keting costs are assumed; this represents an increase of 
$13,913 in real-options value. Furthermore, if expansion 
costs are assumed to be $100,000, the real-options value 
declines to $83,140, a difference of -$13,567 from the base- 
line. When the factors underlying the expansion portion of 
the chooser option (the option to expand marketing efforts) 
are considered, the assumption related to additional market 
share drives the bulk of the real-options value. 
Perhaps the most notable result, however, comes from 
considering how the real-options value changes as a result 
of the changes in the assumptions underlying the option to 
contract or scale back marketing efforts. Here, the real- 
options value does not change as the contraction factor 
varies from zero to one, confirming an obvious result that 
losing market share does not contribute to real-options 
value. Note, too, that the savings realized from the choice to 
scale back marketing efforts must be substantial to illicit a 
change in the real-options value. Under the presented 
assumptions, the cost savings from scaling back marketing 
efforts need to be greater than $39,000 before the real- 
options value of the project increases relative to the baseline 
value of $96,707. Indeed, as the cost savings from scaling 
back marketing efforts increase, so does the real-options 
value. The value obtained from the option to expand mar- 
keting efforts dwarfs that of the option to contract marketing 
efforts. Even at a fairly extreme contraction of sales, .25, 
and $50,000 realized in cost savings, the value of the expan- 
sion factor assumed must be less than 2 to achieve any 
increase in the real-options value from a contraction of mar- 
keting efforts. 
Imperative Redux: The Coordination f 
Marketing, Finance, and Public Policy 
Economies recovering from catastrophes are risky markets 
in which to invest, but investment in them is vital for recov- 
ery. Therefore, policy makers and marketers must find and 
use tools to understand investment risk and stimulate invest- 
This content downloaded from 147.126.10.37 on Wed, 22 Oct 2014 12:45:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
46 A Real-Options Approach in the Wake of Catastrophe 
ment to the immediate and long-term benefit of numerous 
stakeholders. Unfortunately, given the depth and breadth of 
devastation from many catastrophes, extant fears, and sim- 
ply "easier" or "safer" investment opportunities, even if a 
helpful export venture is initially deemed to be feasible on 
the basis of traditional evaluation metrics, decision makers 
likely would not support such a venture. The real and per- 
ceived risks of conducting business in a recovering econ- 
omy may overshadow any potential opportunity; manage- 
ment is likely to view the project as being too risky. These 
factors and the subsequent choice not to invest in markets 
ravaged by catastrophe clearly retard societal recovery, 
resulting in additional hardships and suffering. However, 
considering the real-options value when evaluating the 
financial feasibility of an export venture should provide an 
additional incentive for firms to adopt such a risky venture 
beyond traditional risk assessment and moral imperatives. 
Examining and measuring the risks and, ultimately, the real- 
options value of, for example, export marketing to FYR pro- 
vides substantial insights for marketers who are considering 
similar ventures and also provides guidance to policy mak- 
ers who are charged with assisting recovering economies. 
Key to understanding the real-options value of any export 
or FDI project to a recovering economy is the efficient 
assessment and estimation of the variability of future cash 
flows to the project. We appreciate that some readers may 
find this statement to be rather callous. However, the reali- 
ties of donor fatigue, resource scarcity, and the probability 
of future catastrophes suggest that the private sector, includ- 
ing marketing firms, must have financial incentives to invest 
in currently recovering economies. 
The most meaningful risk assessments probably arise 
from longitudinal field research in the recovering country or 
area of interest (e.g., Shultz et al. 2005), but most managers 
who are pressed for time and forced to make decisions in the 
absence of data will likely not opt for this labor-intensive 
and time-consuming method. We submit that deterrents to 
extensive fieldwork or the lack of data to make volatility 
estimates need not be obstacles to the estimation and con- 
sideration of the real-options value. The framework we pre- 
sented in this research provides a logical, efficient, and 
robust method to forecast the variability (risks) associated 
with investment projects in recovering economies. Indeed, 
in the absence of data, it provides a tool (1) to make reason- 
able assessments of risk; (2) to enable potential investors to 
attach value to risk; and, ultimately, (3) to stimulate invest- 
ment in recovering economies, which is paramount for opti- 
mal recovery and is to the benefit of marketers, policy mak- 
ers, and citizen stakeholders of the devastated country or 
region. 
Market environments with high levels of risk indeed con- 
tain considerable real-options value. This is especially true 
if the investment is considered in terms of conditional 
responses to uncertainty, provided that management main- 
tains the flexibility to respond to the uncertainty. In the con- 
text of an export marketing venture to the countries of 
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, these condi- 
tional responses are assumed to be the combined option to 
abandon the project, to expand marketing efforts, or to scale 
back marketing efforts. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the FYR 
struggling most to emerge from the devastation of war, has 
the highest measured risk and, therefore, the highest real- 
options value in the presence of managerial flexibility. The 
highest-risk projects inherently carry the highest real- 
options value, which argues for marketing strategies that are 
flexible in the presence of this risk and ensure this flexibil- 
ity, such that real-options value is preserved. For example, 
specific marketing strategies, such as strategic alliances, 
should contain enforceable language that enables manage- 
ment to respond to uncertainty. Ultimately, marketing and 
public policies that favor FDI should reward flexibility and 
readiness to respond to both good and bad outcomes that 
may arise during the course of conducting business in a 
recovering economy. Moreover, investments and invest- 
ment incentives invoked by policy makers should facilitate 
market entry and should target sectors that are vital to indi- 
vidual and societal welfare. A few sectors come to mind as 
possible examples: food and agribusiness, health care, com- 
munications technologies, and other industries that connect 
citizens and institutions to local and global marketing sys- 
tems that tangibly enhance socioeconomic recovery. A com- 
monality among them, aside from a demonstrable impact on 
consumer and societal value, is that return on investment is 
likely or certainly possible, even if the investment environ- 
ment deteriorates. 
Our results indicate that the option to expand the export 
marketing venture after it has been initiated contributes 
most to the value of a chooser option. As we described in the 
previous section and in Table 3, real-options value increases 
commensurate with the assumption about increased market 
share from expansion and is inversely related to the cost of 
the expansion. Therefore, "lean" marketing strategies that 
promote rapid market expansion and penetration at a rea- 
sonably low cost should be designed and implemented. 
These are likely strategies that also would benefit from first- 
hand knowledge of local market conditions, solid relation- 
ships with customers and other decision makers in the 
importing country, and policies that foster a certain level of 
business risk taking (e.g., export guarantee programs 
designed to foster trade and development) in recovering 
economies. 
Although an option to expand contributes greatly to the 
value of the chooser option, an option to abandon the export 
venture completely could also be valuable; this is particu- 
larly true when the cost saving or cost recovery realized 
from abandonment is higher. This result suggests that there 
are strong benefits from policies that focus on attracting ini- 
tial investment compared with policies that encourage large- 
scale capital investments in the recovering region. Again, 
the aforementioned sectors come to mind as examples. 
Capital investments in factories, processing facilities, distri- 
bution centers, or other fixed assets may not be salvageable 
if the venture needs to be abandoned. Conversely, marketing 
ventures that rely more on leasing arrangements, strategic 
alliances with local partners, and other strategies that are 
variable-cost intensive versus fixed-cost intensive poten- 
tially provide greater value to the option to abandon in the 
context of the chooser option. Although the option to aban- 
don contributes to the overall value of the chooser option, 
the impact of the option merely to scale back marketing 
efforts is the least valuable; the option to scale back market- 
ing efforts is valuable only if the cost savings from doing so 
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are substantial. Given these contingencies and the inevitable 
impact on the marketing system (especially suffering 
humans), policies should be developed to reward companies 
for staying the course and being aggressive with their mar- 
keting efforts to abet recovery, even in the face of risk. 
Finally, we reemphasize that this framework can be 
applied to several contexts-for example, in the recovering 
economies in the Middle East, Central Asia, Sri Lanka, 
Banda Aceh, and even New Orleans. The factors driving the 
variability of the discounted cash flows over the initial life 
of the venture are likely the same. Furthermore, considering 
the real-options value of any venture in the wake of cata- 
strophe may help convince policy makers to provide incen- 
tives for marketing companies to trade with and conduct 
business in recovering economies. Increased commercial 
activity will create more uniform and effective systems, 
enhance efficiencies, and more broadly lead to win-win out- 
comes for investing firms, as well as the suffering con- 
sumers and marketing firms in the countries and areas 
recovering from catastrophe. 
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